Unlike the legal discourse in the United
incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter, ECHR), challenge this common wisdom. For the first time in English law freedom of expression has gained an explicit status in the legal landscape. Consequently, the Court of Appeal in Ashdown closely examined the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression. The issue is also rather new to other European jurisdictions.
One scholar observed that the ECHR "may serve, perhaps, not as a dyke, but as a lifebuoy for bona fide users drowning in a sea of intellectual property", though he concluded that the practical impact of the ECHR on European copyright law is likely to be limited to specific kinds of expression, i.e. political, journalistic and artistic speech. 6 This article proposes a framework within which to examine the intriguing intersection of copyright law and freedom of expression. It begins with a presentation of the Ashdown judgment. The article then embarks on a comparative analysis of the American experience to this subject, which has over 30 years of judicial and academic experience in this regard. As a general matter, American courts concluded that there is no conflict. The core of the article addresses the complex relationship, and points to a few reasons that might explain why and how the tension has gone unnoticed thus far.
It is then proposed that a distinction should be drawn between two kinds of conflict, in dealing with the copyright law/freedom of expression relationship. The first is internal to copyright law and is the fundamental mechanism thereof: the tension between the individual author and the public. The second conflict is external: it is 6 See Hugenholtz, n. 2 above. First to point to the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression in Europe was H. Cohen Jehoram, "Freedom of Expression in Copyright Law", [1984] 6 (1) where the two legal regimes directly face each other. It is argued that the introduction of the ECHR into the English legal discourse has shifted the emphasis from the internal dimension to the external one. It is further submitted that the EC Copyright Directive, the implementation of which is now considered, might strengthen this shift. 7 The initial legal instinct is to try and re-internalise the argument about a conflict. This might indeed reconcile the appearance of a conflict but might not explain the delicate and complex relationship of intellectual property and freedom of expression. In the process of this argument, the constitutional dimension of this relationship is emphasised. The concluding part of the article returns to Ashdown and explores it according to the proposed framework. It is submitted that the Court has succeeded in recognising all levels of intersection between the two regimes, but that it went only half way in its application to the facts of the case.
II. ASHDOWN V. TELEGRAPH GROUP LTD., AND THE LEGAL SETTING

The Facts
The occasion that gave rise to the legal conflict took place first at 10 Downing Street and then across the pages of the Sunday Telegraph. The dispute emerged after the newspaper published an as yet-unpublished minute written by Paddy Ashdown, then the leader of the Liberal Democrats. It was a minute of a secret meeting Ashdown had had with the Prime Minister in October 1997 several months after the general elections. Two copies of the minute were made. One was kept in Ashdown's safe and the other was destroyed shortly after it was written. Two years later, after resigning from the leadership of his party Mr. Ashdown considered the possibility of publishing his memoirs. In the process of surveying the publishing market, parts of his diaries, including the minute, were presented to several publishers on a confidential basis.
Before any contract was signed the document reached the hands of the political editor of the Sunday Telegraph. On November 28, 1999 The Telegraph broke out with the exclusive story describing the minute as a "leaked document". Its coverage included verbatim quotations of the unpublished minute.
According to the report, 8 the minute exposed the fact that the Prime Minister considered forming a coalition cabinet despite 10 Downing Street's official denials.
Soon after the publication Ashdown sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and infringement of copyright. After a hearing, Sir Andrew Morritt, Vice-Chancellor issued a summary judgment on the copyright claim: an injunction against further infringement was granted as well as an order to disclose information so that Ashdown could choose the remedy: damages or defendant's profits. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal.
The Legal Setting
There is no real dispute that the minute is an original literary work, that it enjoys copyright protection, 9 and that parts thereof were reproduced without the author's permission. Accordingly, the main issue in court was whether the copying and publication of the minute by The Telegraph amounted to "infringement" or whether the latter enjoyed one of the defences offered by the Copyright Act. The Telegraph invoked the obvious defences of fair dealing 10 and public interest, 11 but it also brought to the court a novel claim. It argued that the HRA, and hence Article 10 of the ECHR, require that these defences be interpreted or applied in a manner that preserves its right of freedom of expression. 12 Article 10 reads in its relevant parts as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. … 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, … for the protection of... rights of others...
13
In fact, as reported in the decisions the newspaper's defence was that courts should examine whether "it was necessary in a democratic society" to recognise an exception to the general rule of copyright protection in each and every copyright case. In other 10 See CDPA, s 30.
11 See CDPA, s 171(3).
12 This article focuses on the effect Article 10 has on copyright law in general, rather than on the details of the particular defences. For comments on the case, see A. Sharples, "Copyright: Fair Dealing", http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art55 words, the newspaper argued for the recognition of a new "freedom of expression" exception to copyright law in addition to the existing statutory exceptions.
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In no previous reported case had such an argument been made, though freedom of expression had previously been mentioned in some copyright cases without explication. The invocation of this claim can be explained due to the constitutional changes, which were caused by the enactment of the HRA. Human rights which previously were recognised by the Common Law now enjoy an explicit statutory status. This important change raises many questions as to the workings of English constitutional law.
The Courts' Response
In the High Court (Chancery Division), the Vice-Chancellor was willing to engage
Article 10 in the discussion of copyright law but only to some extent. The judgment was rather moderate in the meaning it was willing to accord to Article 10:
The balance between the rights of the owner of the copyright and those of the public has been struck by the legislative organ of the democratic state itself, in the legislation it has enacted. There is no room for any further defences outside the code which establishes the particular species of intellectual property in question.
15 14 The first instance phrased the defence in the following wording: "[the defendant] contends that in every case all the individual facts must be considered to ascertain whether the restriction on the right to freedom of expression imposed by the CDPA is necessary in a democratic society notwithstanding that the facts do not bring the case within any of the statutory exceptions or defences". -Ashdown I, 693.
Morritt, V.-C. identified no less than 42 circumstances in which copying does not amount to infringement of copyright. 16 This is a key finding, for it was seen as an indication that the legislature considered freedom of expression and took it into account. The Vice-Chancellor went on to reject the specific defences of fair dealing and that of the public interest, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and issued an injunction as to future infringements.
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The Court of Appeal, in a decision delivered by Lord Phillips M.R. and joined by
Walker LJ and Keene LJ dismissed the newspaper's appeal. It phrased its task as one of defining the balance between the two rights, each of which is qualified on its own terms. 18 Like the Chancery Division, it found resort in prior copyright law doctrines, which resolve much of the tension between copyright law and freedom of expression.
One such mechanism is a basic tenet of copyright law: that it accords protection only to the form of the literary work, not to the information it conveys, 19 …rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the Act. In these circumstances, we consider that the court is bound, insofar as it is able, to apply the Act in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of expression. This will make it necessary for the court to look closely at the facts of individual cases (as indeed it must whenever a 'fair dealing' defence is raised). We do not foresee this leading to a flood of litigation.
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After setting the legal framework the court turned to examine the various defences raised by The Telegraph. It endorsed the conclusions of the Vice-Chancellor. The interpretation and application of the fair dealing and the public interest defences were partially influenced by the court's discussion of the implications of the HRA. Ashdown's forthcoming memoirs; that the fact that the minute was obtained by a breach of confidence was a material consideration, and that a substantial portion of the minute had been copied. The conclusion was that the defendant could not rely on the defence of fair dealing. But this was not the end of the discussion, as the court returned to the question of the impact of the HRA on the case. Here, it closely examined The Telegraph's reproduction of Ashdown's minute and found that it was beyond the necessary requirement for reporting the information authoritatively.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The Issue Framed
The issues at stake can now be better defined: in general terms, it is asked: what impact should the enactment of the HRA have on previously existing well-established copyright law? And in particular terms: how should the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression be addressed? Other jurisdictions have struggled with a similar question, chief among them being the American legal system.
III. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
A few cases in the late 1960s drew attention to the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression (or free speech, in American law) even without mentioning the first amendment. 28 The first addressed an attempt by Howard Hughes, an industry tycoon and a highly intriguing character to enjoin the publication of a biography about him. 29 Hughes had acquired the copyright in three previously published articles about him, which he correctly suspected would be used by the biographer as raw material.
He then asserted his copyright and claimed that the biography infringed his rights.
The court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, basing its decision on the fair use defence --the American version of the fair dealing defence. 30 The second case involved the use of sketches based on frames from the famous amateur film of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, in a book about the assassination. 31 The suit of the copyright owner was dismissed since the defendant enjoyed the fair use defence.
However, two prominent scholars and one student seized the opportunity to analyse the copyright law/free speech relationship. The path-breaking work was that of http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art55
"news photographs" that capture historic moments. 33 Other than that he believed that the idea/expression dichotomy mitigates the conflict.
Following this lead the argument that copyright law should withdraw, at least to some extent in the face of free speech, was raised in numerous copyright cases. However, courts rejected it systematically on several grounds. 34 The In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.
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It is interesting to observe the many bases to which the American courts turned in their refusal to acknowledge that there is a conflict between copyright and free speech. One explanation was the constitutional setting. The Constitution explicitly authorises Congress to enact copyright laws. 37 The text of the Constitution and the first amendment were traditionally interpreted to allow limitations of free speech despite the definitive language of the first amendment. But the history of the relationship and the prevalent mode of interpretation, which places great emphasis on the original meaning of the Constitution, resulted in a refusal to acknowledge the tension between the two legal regimes. The framers, the argument goes, enacted both the authority to Congress to enact copyright law and the first amendment. They therefore, implicitly, did not recognise the conflict. 
IV. THE MANY LEVELS OF INTERSECTION
The American experience teaches us that the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression has been systematically ignored and that it is much more complicated than it may first have appeared to be. This section discusses a few possible reasons for rejecting the argument that there is a conflict between copyright and freedom of expression and searches for constructive guidelines.
A Constitutional Dimension
The American experience clearly suggests that the intersection has a constitutional dimension. In the US, this dimension is obvious. In the United Kingdom the legal picture is, at least currently, more complex and it is submitted that the status of freedom of expression is undergoing a transformation. This transformation merits a short documentation. Freedom of expression has been recognised at Common Law, It is still left to be seen how the English judiciary will interpret its powers (or lack thereof) under the HRA. 52 In any case, Article 10(2) of the ECHR lists few conditions, which if satisfied allow for the restriction of freedom of expression. It is clear that the limitation at stake here, is prescribed by law (the Copyright Act). There should not be much, if any doubt as to copyright law's necessity in a democratic state.
Copyright law enhances the creation of information and it's expression, it promotes innovation and cultural production, which enriches the public discourse. Since a restriction is allowed if necessary to protect the rights of others and since there is no doubt that copyright is such a right, copyright law as a whole should not be threatened. However, the HRA instructs (in section 3) that the ECHR should have an interpretive effect: courts should read and construct legislation in a manner which is compatible with the ECHR. 53 Section 12 further instructs courts to take the ECHR into account when ordering a remedy.
The ECHR has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights to include yet further requirements. For our purpose, the requirement of proportionality, already mentioned above, is of special relevance: A limitation of a human right for the benefit of the public should be proportionate to the legitimate public aim pursued. 54 This issue was not discussed in Ashdown. The nature of proportionality still requires further elaboration, but it may serve as an important legal forum for balancing conflicting rights and interests. The emerging European jurisprudence examines under the auspices of the requirement of proportionality not only the validity and importance of the public goal but the relationship between this goal and the means applied to achieve it. In the course of this examination courts consider the extent of the restriction of the human right and the effect it might have and the existence of less restrictive means to attain the public goal.
Applying these requirements to copyright law suggests that the complex details of the statute should be permitted in as much and only to the extent that they promote copyright law's goals. In other words, copyright law should not be taken for granted as immune from judicial review and its details should not enjoy an a-priori immunity.
To the contrary: Copyright law must not run afoul of freedom of expression and it is the courts' role to ensure this through the interpretation of the CDPA. One practical implication is that the ability and power of the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair dealing defence to "take care" of considerations of freedom of expression should be carefully reviewed. This conclusion well-fits the holding of the House of Lords in relation to the intensity of judicial review when human rights are at stake. The House of Lords stated that "the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions." 55 In copyright law terms this implies that a court should not defer to the legislative balance embedded in the internal copyright law mechanisms, but question whether they actually protect the human right of freedom of expression in a proportional manner.
The Horizontal Effect
Another obstacle in acknowledging the conflict between the two legal regimes is the conventional manner in which freedom of speech is thought of. Usually, it arises in the context of the relationship between the government (or the State) and a citizen. This is the governmental paradigm of freedom of speech, or as it is better knownthe vertical effect. But as western democracies turn more and more to market-oriented economies and cultures the source of the threat to the freedom of speech spills over to other players in the democratic field as well, namely the market. In other words, the difficulty in acknowledging the conflict stems from the public/private distinction, 56 and as Professor Bernt Hugenholtz phrased it, the question is "whether freedom of expression and information can be invoked directly ('horizontally') against other citizens." 57 There are several suggestions regarding the possibility of applying the HRA horizontally and the manner to do so. 58 It is important to point not only to the technical way to implement the horizontal effect but to the substantive reasons for doing so. The fact that a player owns the copyright in a work might imply his control 56 For such a claim, see Patfield, n. 2 above, 207-209. 57 See Hugenholtz, n. 2 above, 11, at 247. 58 The prevalent suggestion is to interpret the term "public authority" in HRA s 6, to include the What should be the implication of asserting copyright in the writing? Unless the fair dealing defence or another defence is invoked, the public discourse might suffer. This is an especially problematic issue when political speech is at stake. This kind of expression is typically considered to be more important than other kinds of expression, such as commercial speech. 60 Thus, freedom of expression does not lose its importance once shifted from the vertical sphere to the horizontal one, i.e., from the realm of public law to that of private law. Anne), 63 or the promotion of "the progress" (in the words of the American Constitution). 64 Another version of this idea, perhaps a less extreme one, would suggest that copyright law constitutes a compromise of interests between the public's interest in the wide dissemination of works of authorship and easy access to these works on the one hand, and the "just desert" to the author. 65 These views mean that copyright law does not predate the social order but is created by it. Thus, it is an instrumental conception of copyright law. http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art55 about a conflict between the two does not resonate well with jurists. This difficulty is removed once we are aware of it. There is no inherent truth in legal categorisation.
Categories are meant to assist one in organising the law. It is only an aid, not a goal in itself.
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To summarise, all of the above reasons suggest that there is no genuine reason not to acknowledge the conflict between copyright law and freedom of expression. It is important to clarify that this assertion does not suggest that copyright law should be abolished, only that the conflict should be addressed and resolved. In the course of this discussion, a few guidelines emerged, as to how to solve the conflict. Turning to internal copyright law mechanisms such as the idea/expression dichotomy, the fair dealing defence or other specific exceptions of the 42 mentioned by the courts, is crucial but should not be conclusive. While copyright law as a whole withstands scrutiny, its particular details and interpretation should be subordinated to and influenced by the now higher normative status of freedom of expression. The burden to do so lies on the shoulders of the courts. To a large extent, the Ashdown court followed these guidelines, and did not fall astray, as many of its American counterparts have. Before turning to evaluate the decision, it is useful to outline the framework with which to conceptualise the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression. 
V. COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: TWO CONFLICTS
A prevalent judicial response to the claim that a conflict exists between copyright law and freedom of expression turned to internal copyright mechanisms. Similar to the Ashdown case, many American courts reasoned that since copyright law does not protect ideas there is no real clash. 68 Other courts turned to another copyright law mechanism, the fair use defence, reasoning that it enables the necessary "breathing space" for free speech, and thus, mitigates any potential conflict. 69 This section suggests that two conflicts should be identified -an external conflict and an internal one. Accordingly, a process of internalisation is observed.
Mechanical Internalisation
The arguments that turn to the internal copyright law mechanisms cannot be easily dismissed and in fact they have been raised in many jurisdictions. 70 But while these mechanisms do mitigate many potential conflicts between copyright law and freedom of expression they do not fully resolve the conflict. It has already been pointed out that for constitutional reasons these mechanisms cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, their power to mitigate the conflict has been criticised on various grounds. 71 It is also important to note one further feature of this response: it does not rely on the theoretical justification of copyright law. Hence, it is applicable to any system of copyright law, no matter how it is understood and justified. It is suggested that this kind of rejection of the argument that there is a place for freedom of expression jurisprudence within the contours of copyright law be called mechanical internalisation. This kind of argument refers to a friction between two separate branches of the law: copyright law and freedom of expression. Hence it is a claim that there is an external conflict. The idea/expression dichotomy and the fair dealing defence are part of copyright law but are designated a role in dissolving the appearance of a conflict. Hence, these internal mechanisms enable a court to reject the external aspect of the conflict. Hence it is an internalisation. It is mechanical, for it does not attempt to reconcile the prima facie conflicting areas of the law at a deeper level, that of their theoretical basis.
Substantive Internalisation
The American courts did not end their response to the argument about a conflict with this mechanical internalisation. They alluded to yet a further response, one which refers to the theory that underlies copyright law. claim assumes an instrumental rationale of copyright law. In the words of the American Constitution, it is a tool to "promote the progress of science and useful arts". Such an argument too has the effect of internalising the argument about a friction on the external level. But it differs from the previous one in that it relies on the fundamentals of copyright law. Hence, it is proposed to refer to this sort of response as substantive internalisation.
The Internal Conflict
Once the conflict is internalised the vertical dimension is removed. Courts now can interpret copyright law alone, a task with which they are well-acquainted. Copyright law itself is structured around a fundamental conflict. Unlike the external conflict, the internal conflict is acknowledged and addressed. It can be portrayed along one of several lines. One familiar line is the tension between the rival interests of the public and those of the individual author. The public is interested in widening dissemination of works of authorship, enabling easier access and lowering barriers on using of the works, so they can be used as building blocks for further works. The author wishes to control his work -both in the financial and the cultural sense. Another parallel line is the tension between the present cost to the public and its future gain. As long as a work is protected the public must receive the owner's authorisation to use it.
Copyright is conceived as a means to enhance creative authorship. The words of Lord Macaulay in a speech in Parliament in 1841, opposing a proposal to extend the copyright term beyond the life of the author are a clear reflection of these tensions:
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and salutary of human pleasures… I admit, however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius and learning. In order to give such a bounty, I willingly submit even to this severe and burdensome tax.
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In fact, it is arguable that the entire body of copyright law evolves around these internal conflicts: how best to protect the rights of authors in a manner that would promote the public good without undermining the former interests.
To summarise, this discussion provides a framework and some tools with which to address the complex relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression.
We should distinguish between a claim of an external conflict and an internal conflict.
Once we do so, we should realise that this distinction is not static and the external conflict can be internalised. This might take the form of a mechanical internalisation or of a substantive internalisation. Applying these terms to the American discourse of the conflict results in the following picture: courts that were faced with an argument about a conflict between copyright law and the first amendment, i.e., an argument about the external conflict, internalised it, using both forms of internalisation. This internalisation means that courts defer to the balance struck by the legislature. In a constitutional environment, where courts are in charge of protecting human rights, such an a-priori deference is undesirable. Accordingly, the conclusion should be that both lines of discussion should be undertaken and both the internal and the external dimensions should be carefully examined. 
VI. REVISITING ASHDOWN
The observation that the copyright law/freedom of expression intersection involves two conflicts -an external one and an internal one and the further observation that courts in various jurisdictions often tend to internalise the external conflict and collapse it into the internal one -provide a conceptual framework with which to reexamine the Ashdown case. These observations are based on various dimensions of the complex intersection, especially the constitutional setting.
Up until the enactment of the HRA, no external conflict was visible. While freedom of expression was recognised by the Common Law, it did not enjoy an explicit, superior normative position that was conceived as equal to, let alone superior to, copyright law. Hence the discussion was limited to the internal sphere: how best to achieve the balance which permeates the entire body of law known as copyright law.
The HRA and ECHR paved the way for a shift in the "conflict discourse": the I can see no reason why the court should travel outside the provisions of the CDPA and recognise on the facts of particular cases further or other exceptions to the restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression constituted by the CDPA. 73 The conclusion was clear: " [t] he Human Rights Act is not a reason for interpreting CDPA any differently," 74 although the court did consider article 12(4) of the HRA, which instructs a court to consider the effect of a relief on the exercise of an ECHR right. 75 In the terms suggested earlier, the court turned to a mechanical internalisation of the external sphere. It refused to acknowledge the external conflict and in so doing failed to identify the constitutional dimension of the copyright law/freedom of expression intersection.
Following the V.-C., the Court of Appeal too turned to the internal mechanisms of copyright law which do mitigate much of the apparent conflict. But the courts reached the conclusion that this internalisation is, sometimes, insufficient. In its discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy the Court of Appeal observed that in some cases the form of the expression is just as important as the information conveyed. Fair dealing allows the use of copyrighted expression in some cases but the court pointed to the limited power of the defence. In some instances, it concluded, the defence will not suffice. 76 Accordingly, it declared that in rare circumstances courts should apply the Copyright Act in a manner that will take freedom of expression considerations into account.
While the court did turn to the mechanical internalisation as a first resort to mitigate the apparent conflict, it acknowledged that the external conflict cannot be set aside and that it should be taken into consideration. In the terms proposed here, the court suggests that both dimensions should be taken into consideration and that the power of internal copyright law mechanisms to mitigate the conflicts should not be taken for
granted. This approach is clearly instructed by the constitutional dimension of the conflict and it is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeal's approach is desirable.
The ratio-decidendi of the decision in the appeal is thus that copyright law is not immune from re-examination and that the main influence of the HRA on copyright law should be in the interpretation of the latter. Indeed, the court's own interpretation of the fair dealing defence was partially guided by this conclusion. Thus, for example, it interpreted the term "reporting current news" liberally, so as to include reporting events that occurred two years earlier. While the meeting at 10 Downing Street took place in 1997 and hence in 1999 was no-longer "current", the court found it to be of "continuing public interest". 78 As for which considerations should be taken into account in applying the defence of fair dealing the court applied existing rules, but warned against applying inflexible tests based on precedent.
79
However, it seems that this caution has not been fully followed either in the very outlining of the factors to be considered in the fair dealing analysis, nor in the 78 See Ashdown II, at ¶64. application of the precedents to the facts of the case. In fact, the court adopted the precedent as to fair dealing, precedents, which predate the HRA. Despite the acknowledgement of the fair dealing's shortcomings, the court did not pause to consider these factors. If freedom of expression is to be taken into consideration, as the court agrees, albeit in rare circumstances, this should be done not only at the level of applying the law but also at the level of interpreting and constructing the law. Thus, for example, the court accepts the precedents that emphasised the commercial use of the alleged fair dealing. 80 Considering this factor is more than reasonable and is shared by American copyright law as well. 81 But it is submitted that the effect of the HRA should be, for example, in reconsidering the fair dealing analysis. Not only the commercial use of the alleged fair dealing should be addressed -its purpose, in a wider sense, should also be taken into consideration. Thus, the fact that in Ashdown the use by The Telegraph was one of informing the public, of reporting newsworthy events, all of which are classified as "political speech" -should have been taken into consideration. In other words, it is argued here that the court did not follow its own imperative of interpreting copyright law in light of the ECHR and the freedom of expression.
This failure is also apparent in the application of the factors of fair dealing to the particular facts of the case. The court mentioned that some evidence exists, which points out that the publication by The Telegraph "destroyed" part of the value of the 80 Ashdown II, at ¶ ¶70-71. memoirs. 82 This reasoning reflects the pre-conceptions embedded in the precedent.
One such hidden assumption is that a speech-act can be either commercial or noncommercial, in a binary manner. It is argued that this dichotomy is wanting. In our modern times, it is hard to come up with examples of expressive acts which are purely commercial or purely non-commercial. Nowadays, almost any speech-act has at least some commercial aspect. Hence, it is suggested that the dichotomy should be replaced with a continuum: most speech-acts have both commercial and non-commercial characteristics. The owners of a newspaper enjoy revenue from several sources and in most cases run their newspapers as a business with the intention of profiting therefrom. But the value of newspapers, in general, goes beyond these profits (what economists would call a 'positive externalisation'). The value is the information conveyed to the public, the contribution made to the public discourse and the marketplace of ideas. Accordingly, the fact that the newspaper has a commercial motivation should not blind us from seeing its effect. Accordingly, some effect of the unauthorised publication on the market of the protected work should be tolerated.
VII. CONCLUSION
New technologies challenge old notions as to the regulation of the innovative and It is the present author's conclusion that it is important to observe that the copyright law/freedom of expression relationship has many dimensions, the constitutional dimension being the most important. Thus, it is important to recognise two spheres of tension between copyright and freedom of expression: an external sphere (and accordingly, an external conflict), and an internal sphere (and an internal conflict).
The tendency to internalise the external sphere into the internal one by turning to copyright law mechanisms such as the fair dealing defence should be carefully inspected. Drawing quick conclusions may result in failing to take into account the constitutional dimension of the copyright law/freedom of expression intersection.
These lessons should be taken into account when courts face an argument about a conflict between copyright law and freedom of expression. The effect of the HRA and the ECHR is one of the challenges of current copyright law jurisprudence, a challenge which will be furthered by the implementation of the EC Directive on the harmonization of copyright law.
